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BANKS AND B1 KN c--Bi,,S .nD NOTES-LNOR.M'AMa T OF FICrTrxOUS
PAYEE AS FoRGERY.-H, representing that he had a client, K (in fact a
non-existent person) who desired to borrow money on a mortgage, secured
from the plaintiff his check drawn on the defendant bank to the order
of K, and delivered in return a forged note and mortgage. H indorsed
K's name on the check, followed by his own. After negotiation it was
paid by the defendant drawee. H paid the interest charges on the loan
for four years, but upon his becoming insolvent the fraud was discovered.
In an action by the drawer against the drawee for the amount of the check,
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was refused and ajudgmentvas
rendered for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, (two judges dissenting) that
the defendants motion was correctly refused because the indorsement of
K's name was a forgery. A new trial was granted on other grounds.
McCornack v. Central State Bank, 211 N. W. 542 (Iowa, 1926).
Where the drawer knows that the payee is fictitious, it becomes a
bearer instrument under § 9 (3) of the N. I. L., and the rule as to forged
indorsements has no application. But cf. Write Away Pen Co. v. Bzclmc7,
188 Mlo. App. 259, 175 S. W. 81 (1915); '1926) 11 IowA L. REv. 278 (as-
sumed and trade names not fictitious, and indorsement by party using name
required). But it is otherwise where the drawer does not have such
knowledge. BRANNAN, N. I. L. (4th ed. 1926) 83-101. An imposter
may validly indorse an instrument secured in person under the assumed
name. Corinth Bank & Trust Co. v. Security Nat'l Banlk, 148 Tenn. 136,
252 S. W. 1001 (1923). Where the transaction is not in person there is a
conflict. (1920) 34 HARV. L. REv. 76. But where, as in the instant ease,
a person purporting to be an agent, fraudulently secures a check payable
to the non-edstent principal, most decisions (generally accompanied by
vigorous dissents) consider his indorsement a forgery, allowing the drawer
to recover from the drawee. Robcrtson Banding Co. -e. Brasfid, 202 Ala.
167, 79 So. 651 (1918); Strang v. Westchestcr County Nat'l Bank, 235
N. Y. 68, 138 N. E. 739 (1923); (1923) 7 DINN. L. REV. 582; (1923) 22
AiCH. L. REV. 61. Contra: Marcus v. Peoplcs Nat'l Ban.:, 57 Pa. Super.
Ct. 345 (1914) ; but cf. Lesley v. Ewing, 248 Pa. 135, 93 AtI. S75 (1915). The
dissent in the instant case relied on the drawer's admission of the emistence
of the payee found in N. I. L., § 61; but the majority interpreted this,
in accord with decisions in other states, to properly apply only to situations
where the payee is an infant, unauthorized corporation, or one using an
assumed name, etc. Cf. Soekand v. Storch, 123 Ark. 253, 185 S. W. 262
(1916). BRANNAN, op. cit. supra, at 545-554. Courts refuse to extend
its application to situations similar to that in the instant case. Caledonia,&
Ins. Co. v. Nat'l City Bank, 208 App. Div. 83, 203 N. Y. Supp. 32 (1924).
The equities, however, seem to favor the drawee, especially where the
loss remains undiscovered for a long period. Cf. (1923) 37 Hnv. L. rZv.
149 (suggesting an equitable defense be given to drawee). A possible solution
-would be to amend the N. I. L. so as to provide that the drawer's right
against the drawee in such cases be barred unless notice be given the
drawee within one year (or other relatively short period) after payment.
This -would give reasonable certainty, and would not relieve the drawee
(or purchaser) from his inquiry as to the genuineness of indorsements.
And placing the burden on the defrauded drawer to make discovery within
a reasonable period would eliminate undue accumulation of remote losses
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falling upon the drawee, and make the recourse of the drawee (who before
paying would usually have determined the responsibility of immediate in-
dorsers) against prior indorsers of more positive value. The same remedy
has been applied in most states in the somewhat similar situations relating
to raised and forged checks. PATON, DIGEST (1926) § 2013a.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE LICENSES AS BURDENS ON FOREIGN CObf-
MERCE.-The defendant was convicted under a Pennsylvania statute which
required licenses of those selling steamship tickets, or transportation orders,
to or from foreign countries. Such licenses were procurable with the ap-
proval of the commissioner of banking on the payment of a fee of $50
and the filing of a penal bond. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania and the defendant took the case to the United States
Supreme Court on writ of error. Held, (Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone,
JJ., dissenting) that the judgment be reversed, since the statute, being a
direct burden an foreign commerce, was unconstitutional. Di Santo v. Penn-
sylvania, 47 Sup. Ct. 267 (U. S. 1927).
Where the defendants were salaried employees of transportation com-
panies, somewhat similar statutes have been held unconstitutional as "direct
burdens" on interstate commerce. McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104,
10 Sup. Ct. 881 (1890). (license tax of $100 a year imposed on agent
soliciting trade); Texas Transport Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U. S. 150, 44
Sup. Ct. 242 (1924) (license tax of $400 a year required of general
freight agent); Real Sill. Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup.
Ct. 525 (1925) (tax of $100 a year required of a solicitor). The instant
decision extends these holdings to a situation where the defendant is not
a salaried employee. State regulation of interstate commerce, however,
has been permitted in certain cases, though regarded as a "direct burden,"
where there was no need of a uniform system, and Congress had not
-entered the field. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851)
(pilot regulations); Escanaba & Michigan Transportation Go. v. Chicago,
107 U. S. 678, 2 Sup. Ct. 185 (1883) (bridge regulations); Missouri Pacific
ly. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U. S. 612, 29 Sup. Ct. 214 (1909) (local
freight car switching facilities); see Frankfurter and Landis, Compact
Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Inter-State Adjustments (1925)
34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 685, 720. Likewise under the police power, where
local conditions were deemed to require it. Morgan's S. S. Co. v. Board of
Health, 118 U. S. 455, 6 Sup. Ct. 1114 (1886) (quarantine); Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. 92 (1902) (quarantine); Plumley V.
Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 15 Sup. Ct. 154 (1894) (regulation of sale
of oleomargarine). Such regulation may involve a tax if not for revenue
purposes and not regarded as "unduly burdensome." Morgan's S. S. Co. v.
Board of Health, supra ($30 tax to cover quarantine expenses); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, supra (surplus over pilot costs for relief pilots and their
families). Since the fee prescribed by the instant statute is small and,
as pointed out by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion, its pro-
visions meet a local need in the prevention of fraud, i. e. protecting people
of small means from oppressive sales, it could reasonably be held valid.
It would be better to leave these matters to state regulation until Congress
provides proper national supervision of these employments.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-UNIFORMITY OF FEDERAL INHERITANCE TAx AL-
LOWING CREDIT FOR LIKE TAX PAID TO ANY STATE-The Revenue Act of
1926 [44 Stat. 69, (1926) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1926) § 6336 %a]
imposes a federal inheritance tax, but allows credit, not exceeding 80%
.of the tax imposed, for any inheritance tax actually paid to any state.
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The state of Florida, under whose constitution no inheritance tax can be
levied, sued to enjoin the collection of the federal tax, on the ground that
it was not uniform throughout the United States. Held, that the tax is
proper, and is not subject to collateral attack by a state. Florida v. Mellon,
47 Sup. Ct. 265 (U. S. 1927).
An inheritance tax is almost universally regarded as an excise tax which
is subject only to the constitutional provision that it be uniform throughout
the United States. Knowlton v. Moore, 173 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (1900).
But see Williams v. State, 125 Atl. 661, 664 (N. H. 1924) (held a property
tax); (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 103. This requirement is held
satisfied when the tax "operates with the same force and effect in every
place where the subject of it is found." See the Head Money Cases, 112
U. S. 580, 594, 5 Sup. Ct. 247, 252 (1884). Such was the interpretation
made by the Federal Convention of 1787. See Knowlton v. Moore, supra,
at 106, 20 Sup. Ct. at 772. Thus a liquor tax was considered uniform
though it yielded nothing in dry states. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U. S. 107, 174, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 358 (1911). Likewise a head tax on
aliens landed in any port. Head Money Cases, supra. And an inheritance
tax where the net estate taxed was determined by deducting from the grozs
estate such charges against it as were allowed by the laws of the juris-
diction. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 41 Sup. Ct. 506
(1921). Hence it seems that the tax need not produce revenue in every
state. Nor is it improper because, due to local conditions, it does not bear
equally among the states. LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S.
377, 41 Sup. Ct. 528 (1921). Nor must there be uniformity in the manner
of collection. See Tappan v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 505
(U. S. 1873). Thus, objection to a tax because its execution was forcibly
delayed in certain sections has not been allowed. United States 1'. Riley,
Fed. Cas. No. 16,164 (S. D. N. Y. 1864). While there is an inequality
in the proportion of federal revenue produced among the several states
by the instant tax, it is not borne by the individual, who must pay either
the federal government or the state. Nor does it fall exclusively upon the
states -which levy no inheritance tax, since some states imposing such a tax
have so low a rate that they cannot take full advantage of the credit al-
lowed. See Trumbull, The States' Rights Doctrize (1927) 1 CONN. BAR J.
4,11.
CONTRACTS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-EFFECT OF OPTION TO Buy o. TERMs
TO BE AGREED UPoN-The defendant leased certain premises to the plaintiff,
the lease providing that the plaintiff should have an option to buy within a
specified period, the amount to be paid "on terms to be agreed upon." The
plaintiff remained on the premises about a year, and made improvements
in reliance on the option. The plaintiff attempted to accept by a tender of
cash, and upon the defendant's refusal, brought suit, repeating his tender
of cash and offering to comply with any other terms the defendant might
specify. From a decree granting specific performance on condition of
cash payment, an appeal was taken. Held, that the decree be affirmed.
Morris v. Ballard, 16 Fed. (2d) 175 (C. A. D. C. 1926).
In the absence of a statute, a contract containing a provision for arbi r
tration is not specifically enforceable. Hopkins v. Gilanan, 22 Wis. 476
(1868); (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 670. If, however, the terms to be
arbitrated are not deemed essential, the court will decree specific perfor-
mance. Houston v. Barnett, 90 Or. 94, 175 Pac. 619 (1918); City of An-
niston v. Alabama Water Co., 207 Ala. 497, 93 So. 409 (1922); (1923) 32
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 415. Somewhat analogous to the arbitration cases
are those in which terms are to be later agreed upon by the parties. If
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such terms are regarded as essential, there is said to be no binding con-
tract. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 45; ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's
ed. 1919) 64. What constitutes an essential term is uncertain. But the
time, terms of payment, and the date of conveyance are recognized as such.
Cline v. Strong, 52 Ind. App. 286, 100 N. E. 569 (1913); Binns v. Smith,
93 N. J. Eq. 33, 115 Atl. 69 (1921). The instant "option" does not con-
tain all these stipulations usually regarded as necessary for an offer.
The holding indicates that, in some instances at least, the operative effect
of the offer may depend upon the nature of the acceptance. Thus, if the
plaintiff had attempted to accept "on terms to be agreed upon" it is quite
likely that the court would have denied recovery. Leslie v. Mathwig, 131
Minn. 159, 154 N. W. 951 (1915); see Jamestown Portland Cement Corp.
v. Bowles, 228 Mass. 176, 180, 117 N. E. 41, 43 (1917); of. Sun Printing
& Publishing Ass'n v. Remington P. & P. Co., 235 N. Y. 338, 139 N. E.
470 (1923). Even under the acceptance in the instant case, however,
it is doubtful whether these facts would be sufficient to sustain an action
for damages. Cf. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Remington P. & P.
Co., supra; Prior v. Hilton & Dodge Lumber Co., 141 Ga. 117, 80 S. E.
559 (1913). Yet equity, which is said to require greater definiteness than
law, does grant specific performance under similar circumstances. Hey-
ward v. Willmarth, 87 App. Div. 125, 84 N. Y. Supp. 75 (2d Dept. 1903);
Kastens v. Ruland, 94 N. J. Eq. 451, 120 Atl. 21 (1923); but of. Clino Vi.
Strong, supra. By the use of the conditional decree, in the instant case,
there was no unfair advantage granted to either party. The defendant
thereby obtained the most favorable terms he could have contemplated at
the time he made the offer; the plaintiff was given what he bargained
for, namely, the power of purchasing.
CONTRACTS--THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY'S RIGHT-EQUITABLE OR LEGAL.-
In a corporate reorganization the new corporation (here defendant), in
consideration of a transfer of assets, agreed to discharge the debts and
obligations of the old company. The plaintiff, having a tort claim against
the old company, brought a bill in equity in a Massachusetts court against
the new corporation. The suit was removed to the federal court. Hold,
on demurrer, that a cause of action was stated under Massachusetts law
and that the bill was properly brought in equity. Collins Mfg. Co. 'V. Wiok-
wire Spencer Steel Co., 14 Fed. (2d) 871 (D. Mass. 1926).
Massachusetts has for some time purported to reject a third party bene-
ficiary's right to sue at law. Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37 (1871) ;
see Mellon v. Whipple, 67 Mass. 317, 324 (1854); N. Y. Central Ry. V.
Vermont Central Ry., 243 Mass. 56, 66, 136 N. E. 825, 828 (1922); but
Cf. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 367. But in equity it has, of course,
allowed a third party to recover where a "trust" was held to have been
created. Nash v. Commonwealth, 174 Mass. 335, 54 N. E. 865 (1899).
And it has allowed equitable relief to a third party on the ground that the
promiser's duty is an asset of the promisee. Forbes v. Thorpe, 209 Mass.
570, 95 N. E. 955 (1911). Two later cases may be construed as limiting
the application to situations where assets have been transferred from the
promisee to promisor. New England Structural Co. v. Russell Boiler Works,
231 Mass. 274, 120 N. E. 852 (1918); Codman v. Deland, 231 Mass. 344,
121 N. E. 14 (1918). But recovery under this theory does not seem to be
limited to the specific assets transferred. See Forbes v. Thorpe, supra,
at 581, 582, 95 N. E. at 959; of. Bagaley & Co. v. Waters, 7 Ohio St. 359
(1857) (assumption of debts due some creditors in consideration of trans-
fer of assets is not a "trust" within statute aimed to protect other credit-
ors). And this theory would seem to authorize a liberal recognition of
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creditor beneficiaries' rights should the court feel so disposed. Its defect
lies in its exclusion of donee beneficiaries and in its assumption that a
third party's right is necessarily derivative. See ANsoN, CoTr&cra (Cor-
bin's ed. 1924) § 295. It can not be definitely said that a third party bene-
ficiary's right was originally legal or equitable. Cf. Tondincon v. Gill,
Ambler, 330 (Ch. 1756); Dutton2 v. Poole, 2 Lev. 210 (K. B. 1677). Code
states have referred to it in both ways. Petty v,. Warr n, 90 W. Va. 397,
110 S. E. 826 (1922) (equitable-under subrogation theory); Bank of Lad-
aonia v. Bright-Coy Co., 139 Mo. App. 110, 120 S. W. 643 (1909) (legal-
under transfer of assets theory) ; Brili v. Brill, 282 Pa. 270, 127 At]. 840
(1925) (either). And statutes, permitting recovery by beneficiaries, have
been variously worded and interpreted. Cf. Preston v. Pre3ton, 205 Mich.
646, 172 N. W. 371 (1919) (equitable); Butts v. Butts, 81 W. Va. 55, 94
S. E. 360 (1917) (legal). But there seems no reason for code states to
make such distinctions in their language except for purposes of determining
the right to jury trial or the application of statutes which expressly apply
only to legal or equitable actions. See Clark, The Union of Lazo and
Equity (1925) 25 COL. L. Rsv. 1; cf. Hand v. Kenedy, 83 N. Y. 149 (18SO) ;
Marinack v. Blackburn, 93 W. Va. 585, 116 S. E. 7 (1923) (statute
of limitations). And in non-code jurisdictions purporting to recog-
nize the beneficiaries' right solely in equity the distinction is so slightly
regarded that recovery has been allowed at law where jury trial
was waived. Mobile Shipbuilding Co. v. Federal Bridge Co, 280 Fed. 292
(C. C. A. 7th, 1922). But if such jurisdiction has an illiberal joinder
statute, the right must be called equitable if there is to be joinder of all
parties concerned. See (1922) 20 MicH. L. REV. 543. In the light of these
cases the instant holding seems proper.
CORPORATIONS-SPECIFIC PERFORIANCE DENIED AG.UNST PROMiORn ON
CoN'TRAcT BADE FOR PROPOSED CoRoRToN.-The defendant, represcnting
that a realty corporation was being formed, negotiated to purchase certain
lands from the plaintiffs. The defendant stated to the plaintiffs that he
desired to enter into and execute the said contract and to take title to the
said property in the name of the Ruth Realty Corporation. The agree-
ment was signed "Ruth Realty Corp., by Charles Baum." The corporation
never having been formed, the plaintiff sued the defendant for specific
performance. From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.
Held, that the judgment be affirmed since an agent, contracting for a non-
existent principal, is not responsible on the contract. Weisa v. Bam, 213
App. Div. 83, 217 N. Y. Supp. 820 (2d Dept. 1926).
A promoter who enters into an agreement on behalf of a proposed cor-
poration is not bound where the facts indicate an understanding that the
contract is conditional upon incorporation, and the corporation is not
formed. Belding v. Vaughan, 108 Ark. 69, 157 S. W. 400 (1913). Or
that the proposed corporation alone should be looked to for performance.
Hecknzan's Estate, 172 Pa. St. 185, 33 Atl. 552 (1896) (onepromoter, as agent
of lessor, contracted with the other promoters); Strause v. Richmond
Woodworking Co., 109 Va. 724, 65 S. E. 659 (1909) (delivery of goods
to corporation after formation, corporation alone being billed). Likewise
where there has been an "adoption" by the subsequently formed corporation.
Bradshaw v. Jones, 152 S. W. 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Bterrcs v.
M1ontgomery, 23 Ga. App. 590, 99 S. E. 143 (1919) (provision in contract
releasing promoter upon assumption of obligation by corporation). Such
"adoption" need not be express. Carle -v. Corhan, 127 Va. 223, 103 S. E.
699 (1920) (note for debt under contract accepted from corporation);
Bradshaw v. Jones, supra (services in securing bonuses for proposed rail-
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xoad continued after its incorporation); see Lane & Co. v. United Oil Cloth
Go., 103 App. Div. 378, 380, 92 N. Y. Supp. 1061, 1063 (1905) (delivery
of goods to corporation formed and acceptance of payment therefrom).
In many cases, on facts similar to those in the instant case, courts have
found the contract to be between the third party and the promoter and
have held him responsible for its breach. Desplaines Safety Deposit Co.
v. Bour, 192 Ill. App. 569 (1915) (lease-corporation subsequently formed) ;
Morse v. Illotson & Wolcott Co., 253 Fed. 340 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) (contract
to execute mortgage in return for loan-corporation formed); Hcisen ',.
Churchill, 205 Fed. 368 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913) (purchase of lumber-cor-
poration not formed); (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 192. Or for the purchase price.
Wells v. Fay Co., 143 Ga. 732, 85 S. E. 873 (1915) (delivery to corporation
upon formation); see Lewis v. Fisher, 167 Mo. App. 674, 676, 151 S. W.
172, 173 (1912). On this analysis of the contract relationship, there should
be no objection to granting specific performance in the instant case. Such
is the holding in a recent case. Cf. Jaenke v. Taylor, 161 La. 996, 109
So. 814 (1924) (decree set forth); modified, 160 La. 109, 106 So. 711 (1925)
(corporation never formed).
CRIM INAL LAw-WAIVER OF JuRY TRrAL.-The defendants, indicted for
larceny and conspiracy, waived trial by jury. At the close of the pros-
ecution's evidence, the defendants' motion to withdraw the waiver was
denied and they were convicted. Held, on appeal, that the case be re-
manded since jury trial could not be waived where the court's jurisdiction
-was limited by statute to cases where the court sat with a jury, although
there was no constitutional objection to the waiver of a jury trial. Coln-
• nonwealth v. Rowe, 153 N. E. 537 (Mass. 1926).
Jury trial has been subjected to much adverse criticism as an inefficient
and unjust piece of judicial machinery. Hall, Juries Jeopardize Justice
(1924) 56 CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS, 405; Sebille, Trial by Jury an Ineffective
Survival (1925) 59 Am. L. Rnv. 65; McWhorter, Abolish the Jury (1923)
57 Ai. L. Rsv. 42. Although so firmly imbedded in our constitutions and
judicial thought that there is little chance of its abolition, it seems pos-
sible and desirable to allow the accused to waive it. In Maryland and
Connecticut, where statutes give the courts jurisdiction without a jury if
the accused elects to waive jury trial, it is waived in seventy to ninety per
cent of the criminal cases brought into the courts. Cases are tried in
one-third of the time required for a trial by jury, and considerable expense
is saved to the state. Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts
(1925) 11 MASS. L. Q. 21; ibid. at 97, 104. Waiver of jury trial in state
courts is not forbidden by the Federal Constitution. Hallinger v. Davis,
146 U. S. 314, 13 Sup. Ct. 105 (1892). And the instant case, in suggest-
ing that the state constitution does not prevent a waiver, is in accord
with authority. State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349 (1878); Logan v. State,
86 Ga. 266, 12 S. E. 406 (1890). But where, as in the instant case, a
statute conferring jurisdiction on the court specifies that it sit with a jury,
it has been held that the court has no jurisdiction to try a case without a
jury. Paulsen v. People, 195 Ill. 507, 63 N. E. 144 (1902); see Common-
wealth v. Dailey, 12 Cush. 80, 83 (Mass. 1853). A statutory amendment
has been recommended in Massachusetts empowering the courts to try
all criminal cases (except capital cases) without a jury where the accused
elects to waive his privilege. Report of the Judicial Council of Massachu-
setts (1925) 11 MASS. L. Q. 140; (1926) 12 ibid. 10. The instant case is
of importance in that it indicates that the lack of such legislation is the only
obstacle to the adoption of a highly desirable judicial reform.
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ELECTION OF REMEDIES-PLEADINGS IN TWO INCONSISTENT ACTIONS FILED
SI MULTANEOUSLY-PARTY IN DOUBT AS TO W IICH REMEDY EXiSTS.-The
plaintiff contracted to buy land from the defendant, and paid $5,000 on the
purchase price. The defendant started a suit for specific performance.
The plaintiff then sued the defendant for damages and rescission. The
defendant's motion to strike out inconsistent causes of action was granted.
The plaintiff then served a counterclaim for damages for a breach of the
contract in the specific performance suit, and on the same day amended
his complaint in this action, for the return of the $5,000 on the ground
of fraud of the defendant in inducing the contract. The defendant moved
for judgment on the pleadings. Held, that the motion be denied, on the
ground that there was no election of remedies since only one remedy may
exist. Socolozo v. Stone Realty Co., 128 Misc. 152, 218 N. Y. Supp. 40S
(Sup. Ct. 1926).
Some courts hold that the mere institution of one inconsistent action is
not a conclusive election. Register v. Carmichael, 169 Ala. 588, 53 So. 799
(1910) (must be a detriment to the other party or a judgment before it
is conclusive). Others hold that there is an election as soon as the in-
consistent action is commenced. Frisch v. Wells, 200 Mlass. 429, 86 N. E.
775 (1909). In any event, however, the doctrine of election should apply
only where two inconsistent remedies actually exist. Abbades.-a v. Pzglisi,
101 Conn. 1, 124 AtI. 838 (1924); Bicrce -v. Hutchins, 205 U. S. 340, 27
Sup. Ct. 524 (1906). Accordingly, courts hold that the prosecution to a
non-suit of one of two inconsistent actions is not such an election as to
prevent recovery in the other. Harber -,. Harbor, 158 Ga. 27.1, 123 S. E.
114 (1924) (unsuccessful suit for dower not a bar to recovery of legacy
under -will declaring all bequests conditional upon relinquishment of all
other claims against estate); Nave v. Powell, 02 Ind. App. 274, 110 N. E.
1016 (1916) (unsuccessful defense of breach of warranty no bar to subse-
quent defense on ground of seller's fraud); McGibbon v. Schmidt, 172
Calif. 70, 155 Pac. 460 (1916) (unsuccessful suit to recover payments made
under contract no bar to suit for specific performance). Contra: Foote v.
Scarlett, 134 Atl. 865 (N. J. 1926) (suit for rescission and recovery of
payment is bar to action for specific performance). And it has been
held that there was no election where the inconsistent suit had been dis-
continued and the court in a subsequent action found that there was no
remedy available under the prior action. Schenck v. State Line Tel. Co.,
207 App. Div. 454, 202 N. Y. Supp. 378 (2d Dept. 1923) (deceit action
discontinued because barred by statute of limitations, no bar to suit for
rescission and reconveyance of land); Int'l Realty & Secemity Corp. v.
Vanderpoel, 127 Blinn. 89, 148 N. W. 895 (1914) (suit for rescission and
recovery of payments, voluntarily dismissed because of laches, no bar to
specific performance). But -where the court decided that two remedies
existed, the institution of an action for one has been held an election
although withdrawn before judgment. Ireland v. Wayiiiire, 107 Kan. 084,
191 Pac. 304 (1920) (suit for value of converted property is a bar to suit
for return of property). It has been said that if a party is doubtful
-which of two inconsistent remedies exists upon the facts of his case, he may
pursue one or all until he recovers through one. See Union Central Life
Ins. Co. v. Drake, 214 Fed. 536, 548 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914) ; Rantha v. Tygard,
198 Fed. 795, 806 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); Corbett v. Boston & 11L R. R., 219
Mass. 351, 357, 107 N. E. 60, 62 (1914) ; Richmond Union Ry. v. New Yor:
Seabeach Ry., 95 Va. 386, 28 S. E. 573 (1897) (suit allowed against princi-
pal while suit against agent pending). Contra: Browne v. Folsom, 94 Ola.
286, 222 Pac. 246 (1923). Hence, the instant decision, in holding that
there -was no "election" where the two actions were commenced simultane-
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ously, seems proper since the plaintiff was not permitted to sue for rescis-
sion and damages in the same action. Otherwise, it might be necessary for
him to pursue one action to a non-suit before he could institute the other.
Election of remedies is a harsh doctrine, the benefits of which are question-
able, and its scope should not be extended. See Friederichsen v. Renard,
247 U. S. 207, 213, 38 Sup. Ct. 450, 452 (1917); Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Childs Co., 230 N. Y. 285, 291, 130 N. E. 295, 297 (1921).
EVIDENCE-NEGLIGENCE ACTIoN-ADmIssIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE CARIIED BY DEFENDANT.-The plaintiff, administratrix, sued to
recover damages for the death of her husband caused by the negligent
operation of an automobile by the defendant. The plaintiff's offer to show,
on cross examination of the defendant, that the latter carried liability in-
surance was refused. From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintfl
appealed. Held, inter alia, (three judges dissenting) that it was error to
exclude this evidence. Jessup v. Davis, 211 N. W. 190 (Neb. 1926).
Evidence that the defendant carries liability insurance is generally in-
admissible to establish his responsibility. Hill v. Jackson, 272 S. W. 105
(Mo. App. 1925); Lavinski v. Cooper, 142 S. W. 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
A witness, however, may be questioned to show his connection with the
insurance company for the purpose of impeaching his credibility. Jablonow-
ski v. Modern Cap. Mfg. Co., 279 S. W. 89 (Mo. 1925). A juror can
likewise be challenged on this ground to prevent a biased verdict. Fulcher
v. Pine Lumber Co., 132 S. E. 9 (N. C. 1926). Contra: Adams v. Clino
Ice Cream Co., 131 S. E. 867 (W. Va. 1926). Courts differ as to the method
of such questioning. (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 241; (1926) 10 MINN.
L. REV. 632; (1920) 20 MIcH. L. REV. 563. Such evidence does not tend
to discredit the defendant's testimony. 2 VIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
969. It is possible to argue that because a defendant carried insurance he
may not have exercised due care. Cf. Walters v. Appalachian Power Co.,
75 W. Va. 676, 84 S. E. 617 (1915). Or that such evidence might impeach
his good faith in contesting the suit, inasmuch as defense of such suit
may be a condition precedent to his claim against the insurer. Miller V.
Central Taxi Co., 110 Neb. 306, 193 N. W. 919 (1923). The objection to
such evidence is the general tendency of juries, whenever possible, to shift
losses to the insurance companies. Ronan v. Trumbull Co., 131 Atl. 788
(Vt. 1926). Hence most courts exclude such evidence on this ground unless
the "witness" exception is applicable. Coblentz v. Jaloff, 115 Or. 656, 239
Pac. 825 (1925); Sutton v. Bell, 79 N. J. L. 507, 77 At. 42 (1910). In
the instant case, since the trial judge felt that the circumstances were such
as to render the admission unfair, the appellate court should not have
rendered a contrary ruling.
PLEADING-PARTiS--BRINGING IN TIiRD PERSONS-SECTION 193 OF N. Y.
C. P. A.-In an action by an infant against his vendor to recover a pay-
ment made under a land contract, avoided by the plaintiff on the ground
of infancy, the defendant moved to bring in the plaintiff's alleged principal
as a defendant under the N. Y. C. P. A., § 193. This section provides
that "where any party . . . shows that some third person . . . is
or will be liable to such party . . . for the claim made against such
party . . . the court . . . may order such person to be brought
in." Held, that the motion be denied on the ground that the third parties
were not "presently unconditional indemnitors." Zauderer v. Market St.
L. B. Realty Corp., 218 N. Y. Supp. 669 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
Until recently in this country, in actions historically triable at law for
money judgments only, the defendant could not bring in third parties over
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the objection of the plaintiff. Bauer v. Dcw-y, 166 N. Y. 402, 0 N. E.
30 (1901); Carroll v. Weaver, 65 Conn. 76, '1 Atl. 489 (1894). Section
193 of the N. Y. C. P. A., following the trend of the older English statute,
has changed this in New York. CARMODY, SUPPLEMENT To N. Y. PotACmes
(1924) §§ 176, 193; ENG. PRAC. RULES, Order XVI, rule 48. Other juris-
dictions have reached somewhat similar results by use of the cross-petition.
Nat'l Surety Co. v. Atascosa Ice Co., 273 S. W. S21 (Tex. 1925); Bowan
v. City of Greensboro, 130 S. E. 502 (N. C. 1925). Though the English
statute is expressly limited in application to cases of "contribution or in-
demnity," the courts seem to have given it a liberal interpretation. Payne
v. British Time Recorder Co. [19211 2 K. B. 1 (vendor's seller brought in
by vendor in action by buyer for breach of warranty); (1913) 54 C,%Z.
L. J. 382; (1918) 52 Ir. L. T. 149; WHrrE, THE ANNUAL PMC.ICE (1924)
281. Despite the fact that the language of the New York provision is much
broader, a few decisions under it have been less liberal than the English
cases. May Co. v. Mott Ave. Corp., 121 Misc. 393, 201 N. Y. Supp. 189
(Sup. Ct. 1923) (in suit by broker for commission against vendor, latter
not allowed to bring in vendee who represented there was no broker);
New Netherland Bank v. Good'man, 201 N. Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1923)
(bailee not allowed to bring in receiver of goods in suit by bailor). Cf. Irom-
bach, v. Killian, 215 App. Div. 19, 213 N. Y. Supp. 138 (2d Dept. 1923) (in-
sured not allowed to bring in insurer). More recent cases, however, have been
more liberal. Travlos v. Commercial Union, 217 App. Div. 352, 217 X. Y.
Supp. 459 (1st Dept. 1926) (re-insurer brought in by insurer); Williams
-v. Thomphins, 206 N. Y. Supp. 637 (1st Dept. 1924) (person assuming
responsibility on notes brought in by maker); Klcinnzan v. Casc Nat'l
Bank, 124 Misc. 173, 207 N. Y. Supp. 191 (1st Dept. 124) (indorser brought
in by subsequent indorser); (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 593; Rothschild, Civil
Practice in New York (1923) 23 COL. L. Rev. 618, 630. The instant case,
in limiting the application of the section, seems directly opposed to the
spirit of modern procedure.
FIXTURES-CNDiTIONAL VENDOR HAs NO LIEN ON THE: IIELTY.The
plaintiff installed electric wires and fixtures in the defendant's building
under a conditional sales contract. The other defendants secured sub-
sequent liens on the realty. After the vendee failed to pay the agreed
price, the plaintiff sued for a lien upon the realty and for a decree that
the premises be sold. Judgment was given for the plaintiff by the lower
court. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed on the ground that
the contract provided only for retention of title and not a lien, and that
no lien on the realty existed either by virtue of statute or the common law.
East N. Y. Electric Co. v. Petmaland Realty Co., 243 N. Y. 477, 154 N. E.
530 (1926).
Where removal of a fibture will not materially injure the premises, a
vendor retaining title may assert his right against a prior mortgagee.
Detroit Steel Co. v. Sisterville Brewvig Co., 233 U. S. 712, 134 Sup. Ct.
J753 (1914); Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637, 34 Sup. Ct. 459 (1914); Power
Mfg. Co. v. Bailey, 131 Atl. 696 (Del. Super. Ct. 1925); Davis v. Bliss, 187
N. Y. 77, 79 N. E. 851 (1907); DeBevoise -e. Maple Are. Const. Co., 223
N. Y. 496, 127 N. E. 487 (1920). As against a subsequent real mortgagee,
there is said to be some conflict as to the rights of a conditional vendor.
(1921) 13 A. L. R. 478, note. But usually where the chattels are found
to be removable the conditional vendor is protected. Ritchie v. So. GcM
,Coal Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 605 (E. D. Ill. 1926) (chattels held irremovable);
Anglo-American Mill Co. v. Community Mill Co., 41 Idaho, 561, 240 Pac.
446 (1925) (chattels held removable). The mere fact that some damage
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will result from removal is not enough to preclude removal. DeBcvoiec v.
Maple Ave. Const. Co., supra (leaving exposed part of unplastered walla
not "substantial injury"); Central Union Gas Co. v. Browning, 210 N. Y.
10, 103 N. E. 822 (1913) (gas ranges held removable); cf. Kirk v. Crystal,
118 App. Div. 32, 103 N. Y. Supp. 17 (1st Dept. 1907), aff'd 193 N. Y. 622,
86 N. E. 1126 (1908) (heating plant consisting of boiler and pipes through
building connected with radiators held not removable). In the instant case
the jury found that the equipment was not removable without material
injury to the freehold. This rendered ineffectual "the reservation of prop-
erty" as against any person who had not assented thereto. Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act, § 7; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 42, § 67.
The plaintiff in the instant case could have protected himself by filing a
mechanic's lien at the beginning of the installation for the full amount,
of the contract price. Heinlein v. Murphy, 3 Misc. 47, 22 N. Y. Supp. 713
(Brooklyn City Ct. 1893); see Barrett v. Schaefer, 162 App. Div. 52, 57,
146 N. Y. Supp. 1056, 1060 (2d Dept. 1914). Such lien would be effective
from the date of filing. N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 34, § 3. It
has been held that where the chattels have been irremovably installed, and:
such lien has been filed, the vendor cannot enforce his rights under the
conditional sales contract, on the ground of election. Kirk v. Chrystal,
supra; Bramhall, Dean Co. v. McDonald, 172 App. Div. 780, 158 N. Y. Supp.
736 (1st Dept. 1916). Irremovability alone, however, would justify such
holdings within the instant case. A reservation in the conditional sales
contract of a power to file a mechanic's lien does not of itself constitute an
election. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268, 36 Sup. Ct.
50 (1915). It would seem that if such power were reserved to file a lien
covering chattels installed, the filing of the lien as to the chattels installed
should not destroy the vendor's right under the conditional sales con-
tract as to the uninstalled chattels. But in the absence of a mechanic's
lien, a few courts, in circumstances similar to those of the instant case,
have protected the conditional vendor by giving him an equitable lien.
Camden v. Fairbanks, 204 Ala. 112, 86 So. 8 (1920), 206 Ala. 293, 89 So.
456 (1921); Wolf v. Herman Savings Bank, 168 Mo. App. 549 (1912).
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-RECOGNITION BY STATE COURT OF FEDERAL AU-
THORITY TO FIX INTRASTATE RATEs.-Under the Transportation Act of 1920,
§ 416 [41 Stat. 484, U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 8581-4] the Inter-
state Commerce Commission has authority, when it "finds that any rate
causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prej-
udice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one
hand and interstate . . . commerce . . . on the other . . . or
unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce . . ." to
"prescribe the rate . . . thereafter to be charged, . ." The In-
terstate Commerce Commission, finding that intrastate rates were so low
as to discriminate against Fargo, North Dakota, in interstate commerce, in-
creased intrastate rates in Minnesota within 232 miles of North Dakota. A
suit by the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission to enjoin the use
of such rates was dismissed. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be af-
firmed on the ground that the court had "no authority to make or unmake'"
such rates. State ex rel. Railroad and Warehouse Commission v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 210 N. W. 399 (Minn. 1926).
The instant case is of interest in that it is a recognition by a state court,
of the authority of the federal government to regulate intrastate rates.
Query, however, as to how great the interest of the locality discriminated'
against must be in proportion to the intrastate commerce affected before sueh
recognition will be given.
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TRUSTS-RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-PROMISSORY UNDERTAIX-
ING TO HOLD IN TRUST.-Upon the defendant's representation that certain
land could be purchased to advantage for the purpose of erecting a theater,
the plaintiff paid to the defendant money to purchase the land, the de-
fendant orally agreeing to take title in her own name for the benefit of
the plaintiff. The defendant purchased the land and, since a zoning resolu-
tion prohibited the erection of a theater, she subsequently contracted to
sell the land to a third person, intending to keep the proceeds. The plaintiff
sued to enjoin the sale, but subsequently agreed to allow the sale upon con-
dition that the proceeds be held subject to the outcome of the suit. The
lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
Held, that the judgment be affirmed on the ground that the defendant held
the land in trust for the plaintiff, section 94 of the Real Property Law being
inapplicable since it would be unconscionable for the defendant to retain
-the property in view of the e-xpress agreement to hold in trust. Watera
v. Hall, 218 App. Div. 149, 218 N. Y. Supp. 31 (1st Dept. 1926).
Normally, where lands are conveyed to one person, the consideration for
which is wholly paid by another, a trust results in favor of the perzon who
paid. Mercury Club v. Keillcn, 153 N. E. 753 (Ill. 1926); see O'Bricil t.
Gill, 166 App. Div. 92, 97, 151 N. Y. Supp. 682, 685 (2d Dept 1915). Such
a resulting trust has been abolished in New York by statute. Real Prop-
erty Law, § 94; Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y. 475 (1857); Dougla,
-v. Kohart, 196 App. Div. 84, 187 N. Y. Supp. 102 (2d Dept. 1921). For
similar statutes, see Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) §§ 11571--3; Minn. Gen. Stat.
(1923) §§ 8086-8; Wis. Stat. (1921) §§ 2077-9; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1015)
§§ 2353-4; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) c. 67, §§ 406-8 (provision for prezer-
vation of trust where express oral agreement shown); Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1926) §§ 13447-9 (same). Under such a statute, some courts have
not allowed proof of an oral agreement on the part of the grantee to
hold the land for the one paying the consideration. Ames, Oral Truts in
Land (1907) 20 HARV. L. REV. 549, 555 et scq. Cf. Deposit Bank v. Rose,
113 Ky. 946, 69 S. W. 967 (1902) (return of purchase money allowed). The
statute is inapplicable where a trust has been declared in writing. Wocrz
v. Rademacher, 120 N. Y. 62, 23 N. E. 1113 (1890). An express oral
trust cannot be specifically enforced as such unless a "part performance"
is shown. Real Property Law, §§ 242, 270. Cf. Canada v. Totteiz, 157 N. Y.
281, 51 N. E. 989 (1898). But neither section 94 nor section 242 can be
availed of by the creditors of the grantee in a contest with the cestui if
the grantee is willing to carry out the oral trust. Sicmon v. Schurc:, 29
N. Y. 598 (1864). Nor by the grantee where a constructive trust will be
imposed. Cf. Poppenhusen v. Poppcwhusen, 68 Mlise. 548, 123 N. Y. Supp.
269 (1910), af'd 149 App. Div. 307, 133 N. Y. Supp. 887 (2d Dept. 1912)
(grantee president of corporation paying consideration); Widwayer v.
Warner, 192 App. Div. 499, 182 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dept. 1920) (grantee
orally agreed to hold only as security until payment of purchase price by
buyer); cf. (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 682. Likewise where the land
has been sold in accordance with the oral agreement, neither section 94
nor section 242 prevents recovery of the proceeds by the cestui, it being con-
sidered an oral trust of personalty. Bork v. Martin, 132 N. Y.
280, 30 N. E. 584 (1892). The basis of relief in the New
York cases seems to be to prevent unjust enrichment. Where the
court is convinced that the parties understood that there was to be no
gift to the grantee, recovery is not denied by reason of sections 92 and 242.
Whitaker v. Westberg, 124 Mlisc. 556, 208 N. Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1925),
aff'd 215 App. Div. 785, 213 N. Y. Supp. 935 (2d Dept. 1925) (grantee
-orally promised to convey to buyer upon demand).
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TRUSTS-TAXATION OF THE EXERCISE OF A POWER OF APPOINTMIENT BY
THE DONEE OVER A FOREIGN TRUST.-The donee of a power of appointment
over a trust created and administered outside of North Carolina, the
domicil of the donee, exercised the power by a will probated in that state.
The res was outside of North Carolina. A tax levied under a state statute
(which taxed transfers made by or in default of a power of appointment
as though the property belonged absolutely to the donee of the power)
was upheld by the state court. The case was taken to the United States
Supreme Court on writ of error. Held, that the tax was a taking of
property without due process of law since the trust estate had no situs
actual or constructive in North Carolina. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Doughton, 47 Sup. Ct. 202 (U. S. 1926).
A tax levied under a statute similar to that of North Carolina has been
upheld where the res was "within the state." Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278,
22 Sup. Ct. 213 (1902) (tax allowed under statute passed after creation.
of power of appointment). Tangible property is within the state of its
actual situs for this purpose. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45,
Sup. Ct. 603 (1925). Intangible property, however, is said to have a con-
structive situs at the state of the domicil on the ground that such state
controls the privilege of succession. Silverman v. Blodgett, 105 Conn. 192,
134 Atl. 778 (1926). But see (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 694. A tax like,
that sought to be imposed in the instant case is said to be on the privilege
to exercise the power of appointment, and, within the preceding case, might
be held taxable at the domicil. Cf. Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S. 466, 27
Sup. Ct. 550 (1907). But the validity of the exercise, however, is not,
determined by the law of the domicil of the donee of the power, but by the
law of the place where the trust is created. Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass.
263, 116 N. E. 549 (1917) (state of donor of power recognized appointment
although not valid under laws of state of donee). And, as in the instant
case, where the res of a foreign trust subject to a power of appointment
is without the state, it has been held that tho state of the donee can not
tax. Walker v. Treasurer, 221 Mass. 600, 109 N. E. 647 (1915); In ra
Canda's Estate, 197 App. Div. 597, 189 N. Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dept. 1921);
In re Bowditeh's Estate, 189 Calif. 377, 208 Pac. 282 (1922). The same
analysis might have been applied to the situation where a power of re-
vocation has been reserved by the cestui-settlor over a foreign trust; but
such a tax has been upheld. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup.
Ct. 473 (1916). Cf. (1926) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 283. This holding, as
pointed out in the minority opinion in the instant case, appears to be in-
consistent with the decision of the majority. The present result is satis-
factory in that it reduces multiple taxation, since the state where the
trust is created usually taxes transfers by appointment. In re Thorne'&
Estate, 145 Minn. 412, 177 N. W. 638 (1920); In re Hostetter's Estate,
267 Pa. 193, 109 Atl. 920 (1920); cf. In re Schmidlapp's Estate, 236 N. Y.
278, 140 N. E. 697 (1923) (tax by state where trust is administered on
transfer at death of non-resident who had power of revocation).
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-VENDEE'S LIEN GRANTED TO ASSIGNEE OF SUB-
vENDEE.-L, having contracted to sell land to K, became unable to convey
marketable title. The plaintiff, a subsequent assignee of a sub-vendee,
joined as defendants his immediate assignor, the original vendee, K, and
the original vendor, L, in a suit to recover the amount paid by the plaintiff
on the contract of assignment, and claimed a lien on the land for such
amount. L's motion to dismiss the complaint and to cancel the lis pendens
on the land was granted and the plaintiff amended his complaint so as not to
claim the lien. The plaintiff's assignor moved for an order vacating the can-
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cellation of the lis pendens and the discontinuance against L. The motion
was denied. Held, on appeal, that the order be reversed since the plaintiff
is entitled to a vendee's lien, and his immediate assignor is entitled to
such lien if compelled to return payments made by the plaintiff, as though
they were the assignees of the original vendee. Epstin v. Kroopf, 213
N. Y. Supp. 644 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1926).
New York seemed finally to have abandoned Fry's rule of mutuality
when it held that the vendee's assignee could obtain a decree for specific
performance against the vendor, conditioned upon performance by the as-
signee. Epstein v. Gluclkin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 361 (1922). But
the old spectre of mutuality was revived by a lower New York court, which,
while professing to follow Epstcin v. Gluhn, held that the vendee's as-
signee, having demanded specific performance from his vendor, gave the
latter the right to specific performance against the assignee, since such
an assignee had been held entitled to specific performance against a vendor.
H. & H. Corp. v. Broad Holding Corp., 204 App. Div. 569, 198 N. Y. Supp.
763 (2d Dept. 1923). This decision was widely criticized since it gave
the vendor a right for which he had not contracted, and imposed on the
assignee a duty he had never assumed, and also because it was believed
that Epstein v. Gluckin had discarded the concept of mutuality as a work-
ing tool in cases of specific performance. (1923) 32 YALE LW Jou ;%L,
831; (1923) 37 HARV. L. Rm. 162; (1923) 8 CoRN. L. Q. 374. The same
court now gives the assignee of a sub-vendee an equitable lien against
the vendor to the extent of the original vendee's interest and supports
its decision by reference to Epstcin v. Gluchin and the H. & H. Corp. case.
In the instant case, however, the plaintiff is granted not specific perfor-
mance, but recovery of money paid on a contract of assignment. The
plaintiff unquestionably has such a right against his assignor. The latter's
assignor, in whose place he stands, can recover against his vendee under
the contract of sale. Winn v. Strong, 196 Iowa, 498, 194 N. W. 50 (1923);
of. Young v. JeweIl, 206 Ky. 380, 267 S. W. 164 (1924) (recovery by grantee
against remote grantor for deficiency in acreage not allowed because rEmedy
said to be against immediate grantor); but cf. Lassiter v. Farris, 202 Ky.
330, 259 S. W. 696 (1924> (purchaser suing for deficit in acreage properly
joined grantor's grantor as party defendant). The original vendee in turn
has an equitable lien on the land to the extent of the money paid to the
vendor. Davison v. MacDonald, 124 Misc. 726, 209 N. Y. Supp. 145 (Sup.
Ct. 1925). The instant decision, in allowing an action against the original
vendor, avoids circuity of action, is not unfair to either the original vendor
or vendee, and reaches a desirable result, a result which, however, does
not inevitably follow from Epstein -v. Gluckin. It is difficult to see any
connection between the problems presented in the present case and those
in the H. & H. Corp. case which the court in the instant case cites at great
length.
WILLS-ADEIPTION AND SATISFACTION OF LEGACIES AND DEVISES.The
testator executed a will giving his son, the defendant, a one-half interest
in all real and personal property. A one-quarter interest was given to each
of his two grandchildren, the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the testator deeded
one-half of his real property to the defendant for a nominal consideration.
Upon the death of the testator, all of the personal property was used in pay-
ing the debts of the estate. The plaintiffs sued to quiet title to the remaining
land, contending that the devise to the defendant was satisfied by the
conveyance to him. The defendant filed a cross-bill claiming one-half of
the remaining land under the will. Evidence that the deed was given in
satisfaction of the devise was excluded and judgment was rendered for
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the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed, since there
can be no ademption or satisfaction of a devise of real estate. Kemp v.
Kemp, 154 N. E. 505 (Ind. 1926).
A legacy, either specific or general, may be adeemed, or more accurately,
satisfied, by a gift to the legatee during the testator's life subsequent to the
making of the will. See Kramer v. Kramer, 201 Fed. 248, 255 (C. C. A.
5th, 1912) ; (1924) 24 COL. L. Rnv. 405, n. 2. If the testator is in loco paren-
tis to the beneficiary and the gift is ejusdem generis as the legacy, a presump-
tion of a satisfaction is raised. Richards v. Humphreys, 15 Pick. 133 (Mass.
1833); Gibson v. Buis, 142 Tenn. 133, 218 S. W. 220 (1919); but of. John-
son v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850); Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240, 13
Atl. 414 (1888). Otherwise, intention must be clearly shown. In To
Cramer, 183 Wis. 516, 198 N. W. 386 (1924) (testator not in loco
parentis); Carmichael v. Lathrop, 108 Mich. 473, 66 N. W. 350 (1896)
(gift not ejusdem generis); Burnham v. Comfort, 108 N. Y. 535, 15 N. E.
710 (1888). (gift of money not satisfaction of devise of realty) ; of. In To
Lefever, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 189 (1909) (legacy satisfied by gift of realty);
cf. Weston v. Johnson, 48 Ind. 1 (1874); Arthur v. Arthur, 10 Barb. 9
(N. Y. 1850). It has been held, however, that the doctrine of satisfaction
does not apply to a devise .of realty, no distinction being drawn between
specific and general devises. Arthur v. Arthur, supra; Weston v. Johnson,
supra, relying on dicta in Davys v. Boucher, 3 Y. & Col. 397, 411 (Ex.
1839). For cases following, but criticising this view, see Allen v. Allen,
13 S. C. 512, 527 (1879); Burnham v. Comfort, 37 Hun, 216, 220 (N. Y.
1885). Contra: Hansbrough's Ex'rs v. Hooe, 12 Leigh, 316 (Va. 1841).
This exception appears to have originated by analogizing satisfaction and
revocation in applying the revocation provision in the Statute of Frauds,
and the later one which was in the Wills Act. See Davys v. Boucher, supra,
at 411; Arthur v. Arthur, supra, at 20, 22. Revocation, oral or implied,
and ademption or satisfaction, however, rest on different bases, and should be
distinguished. See Gregory v. Lansing, 115 Minn. 73, 77, 131 N. W. 1010,
1011 (1911); Jacobs v. Button, 79 Conn. 360, 365, 65 AtI. 150, 152 (1906).
These statutory provisions were aimed at oral and implied revocations. See
(1909) 4 ILL. L. REv. 350; (1920) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 468. The fact that
satisfaction is allowed in bequests and legacies indicates that there is noth-
ing inherent in present statutes preventing satisfaction of devises. The policy
'behind satisfaction is to prevent double portions. See In re Blundell [1906]
2 Ch. 222, 226, 227. This policy appears to apply with equal force in the
case of devises, and in view of the illogical origin of the rule to the contrary,
such policy should control.
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